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Even though organizations have developed and 
implemented a number of security countermeasures, 
computer abuse continues to be a problem, and 
information systems in organizations today remain in 
jeopardy.  Researchers recommend security awareness 
programs as a means to increase security interest and 
knowledge, but this has not provided satisfactory results.  
In this paper, we introduce the concept of security 
knowledge management systems (SKMS).  These systems 
overcome time and place limitations, consider different 
levels of security knowledge among users, promote 
voluntary participation, and provide a positive framework 
for learning security knowledge.  SKMS gives users a 
way to overcome the limitations of traditional awareness 
programs through the ability to acquire the most current, 
diversified security knowledge, to search the knowledge 
more quickly and accurately, to store it more securely, to 
share it conveniently, and to maintain it cost effectively.  
As a result, SKMS allows users to acquire better security 
knowledge, while giving organizations a cost-effective 




Despite the fact that organizations have developed and 
implemented a number of security countermeasures, 
computer abuse has continued to be a problem (Meyer, 
1995; Straub and Welke, 1998; Timothy and John, 1999).  
Moreover, the frequency of computer abuse and its 
amount of loss are expected to grow as computer abuse 
occurs at the hands of highly sophisticated and educated 
criminals armed with the latest information technology 
(Baskerville, 1993; Straub and Nance, 1990).  Computer 
abuse can be defined as “any intentional act associated in 
any way with computers where a victim suffered, or could 
have suffered, a loss, and a perpetrator made, or could 
have made again"(Parker, 1981:333).  It includes all 
crimes against hardware, programs, data, and computer 
services (Kling, 1980; Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Lee, et 
al., 1986; Straub, 1990).  There are many cases that reveal 
how critically organizations are victimized by computer 
abuse (ABA, 1984; Straub, 1986; Hoffer and Straub, 
1989; BloomBecker, 1989; Goodhue and Straub, 1991; 
Harrington, 1995; Strain, 1991; Weiss, 1991; Meyer, 
1995; Fink, 1995; Mulhall, 1997; Stephen, 1998; CSI, 
1999; Ernst & Young, 2000).  For example, Mulhall 
(1997) states that 41% of computer systems in the U.S. 
were subjected to various computer abuses in 1996.  The 
Computer Security Institute (1999) reports that 51% of 
organizations responded on a survey experienced 
financial loss by computer abuse that approximate $124 
million in 1999, and the figure is expected to rise 
continuously.  Amid this growing problem, previous 
studies have investigated the issue of why computer abuse 
has not been reduced despite companies’ increasing 
investment in computer security, have attempted to find 
ways to reduce computer abuse. 
They usually agree on the three main causes: 
inappropriate enforcement and operation of a security 
policy, ill-suited security standards in system 
development/purchasing and operations, and a relatively 
low level of interest and awareness of organizational 
members in computer abuse.  As a solution to these 
problems, the studies have recommended that 
organizations implement security awareness programs 
(Crockett, 1998; Fites and Kartz, 1993; Smith, 1993; 
Stephen, 1998; Ulsch, 2000; Wood, 1994; Zajac, 1988).  
For example, Ulsch (2000) recommends security 
awareness programs as the most effective tool to 
overcome the lack of concern about computer security 
within top management.  Smith (1993) emphasized the 
importance of a security awareness program, mentioning 
that  "raising awareness and educating a wide audience in 
the basics of computer security will achieve, pound for 
pound, a far more profound and longer lasting 
improvement in computer security than any purely 
technical solution could ever hope to achieve"(p. 237). 
Although previous studies have suggested practical 
ways to conduct security awareness programs, such as 
training courses accompanied by publications, posters, 
newsletters, bulletins, trinkets with a security message, 
and security regulation statements (Fites and Kartz, 1993; 
Meyer, 1995; Smith, 1993; Wood, 1991; Zajac, 1988), 
these approaches have some limitations in providing users 
with useful and timely security awareness and knowledge.  
First, such programs focus only on managers, excluding 
operational-level employees who also account for a large 
portion of computer abuse (e.g, Hoffer, 1989; Rose and 
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Tom, 1989; Wood, 1991).  Second, these programs have 
been, at best, sporadic efforts, not leading to regular, 
routine security related activities in organizations.  As a 
result, the useful, just-in-time security knowledge has not 
been made available to organizational members.  Third, 
such programs do not consider different levels of 
employee security knowledge, limiting the effectiveness 
of education.  Finally, the compulsory nature of 
traditional security awareness programs has made 
participatory security knowledge sharing difficult (Rose 
and Tom, 1989; Straub and Welke, 1998; Parker, 1998).  
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a 
conceptual model of a new type of system called security 
knowledge management systems (SKMS), aimed at 
addressing the problems mentioned above.  An SKMS is a 
type of hybrid system that combines the concept of an 
escalation path of human security experts with that of 
knowledge management systems.  Both concepts have 
proven their value in real world settings by their ability to 
promote greater user satisfaction, increased interest, and 
efficient knowledge management (El Sawy and Bowles, 
1997; Buckman, 1998).  By introducing these benefits, 
SKMS can support organizational members through more 
efficient acquisition, searching, and sharing of security 
information. 
 
Research Model  
 
The SKMS model, shown in Figure 1, consists of four 
main system modules: knowledge acquisition, knowledge 
search, knowledge storage and knowledge sharing.  We 
divide the system into four modules, according to the 
general classification of knowledge management systems 
(e.g., Choo, 1998; Nonaka and Tachuchi, 1995). An 
organization can operate SKMS under its normal network 
environment, including its intranet, or using the Internet.  
SKMS is supported by several information technologies, 
such as a web-based graphical user interface (GUI) and a 
trusted security knowledge base (web server), as shown in 
Figure 1.  As mentioned above, it is also characterized by 
a leveled escalation path of security managers. This 
concept is adopted from consumer support systems (e.g., 
help desk) that are widely used in the service industry 
(e.g., El Sawy and Bowles, 1997).  An important aspect of 
SKMS involves its ability to motivate organizational 
members to learn more about security and to apply 
effective security principles.  We discuss the vital issue of 
motivation in a subsequent section of the paper.  In this 
section, we first discuss each of the SKMS modules in the 
following sections. Secondly, we discuss the issue of 
implementing SKMS in the organization by integrating it 
with traditional security awareness programs. 
 
Knowledge Acquisition Module 
Security knowledge is generated from three sources: 
organizational members (i.e., users, IT experts, and 
security managers), outside sources (e.g., security 
consulting co., secure system vendors, or research 
organizations), and content-based search engines.  One of 
the main differences between SKMS and conventional 
security awareness programs is that by using SKMS 
organizational members can play more active roles in 
generating security knowledge.   
 
Figure 1. The Framework of SKMS 
 
While not all knowledge is generated by users, the 
concept of user participation in security knowledge 
creation is important since many researchers report that 
the IT department does not often have enough information 
about computer abuse in the real operational world (e.g., 
Wood, 1991; Parker, 1998).  Since users are the people 
who experience the risk of day-to-day computer abuse, 
they often know how to apply appropriate 
countermeasures.  Organizational IT experts can also 
generate security knowledge.  There are numerous IT 
experts within the organization who have special 
knowledge for solving specific security problems.  To 
draw out employees’ and IT experts' tacit knowledge, 
SKMS requires them to develop their own homepages.  
These homepages should contain information about their 
own expert knowledge along with references to experts 
whom they know.  This concept is currently being utilized 
in BP AMOCO (Newing, 2000).  Additionally, security 
managers play a key role in creating security knowledge.  
They develop this knowledge through their own expert 
knowledge, from outside security experts (e.g., security 
counselor, security product vendors, and specialized 
security organizations such as CERT), and from a variety 
of documents from security journals and hacker's Internet 
sites.  
Security knowledge can also be acquired using 
bulletin board systems (BBS) from the SKMS homepage, 
as well as content-based search engines and collaborative 
filtering methods.  Users can suggest security solutions 
using the BBS, while a content-based search engine 
automatically collects multimedia files related to 
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computer security.  A search engine can help in gathering 
Internet-based security information that includes audio, 
video, and text (Chang et al., 1999).  Using an intelligent 
filtering algorithm, users can gather only the information 
they want.  Collaborative filtering methods can reduce the 
burden on security managers for reading unnecessary 
information gathered by content-based search engines 
(Avery and Zeckhauser, 1997).  Security managers update 
the security knowledge base after collecting all of the 
information and then verifying its appropriateness through 
communication with other security experts.  Figure 2 
shows the SKMS knowledge acquisition mechanism. 
 
Figure 2. Knowledge Acquisition Module 
 
Knowledge Search Module 
 
The second module in SKMS is the knowledge search 
module.  Organizational members can search security 
knowledge using two search methods: a human security 
expert-based search and a knowledge search engine.  The 
expert-based search method has its origins in help desk 
systems that utilize “escalating paths” of helpers (see Fig. 
1).  In such systems, helpers are usually divided into two 
or three levels, according to their work and scope of 
responsibility (i.e., the higher the level, the greater the 
responsibility and security knowledge).  This approach 
has proven to have many benefits to users, such as 
qualified service, quick response, and increased 
satisfaction.  It also gives each security expert the chance 
to concentrate on his/her own sub-domain of expertise 
and to increase specific knowledge on the problems that 
are frequently requested.  
As mentioned above, users can also access a security 
knowledge base using context-based search engines.  
Users' access to certain documents can be logged, and 
based on the statistics, the security department can find 
the most frequently occurring problems in the 
organization.  User feedback on the materials accessed 
from the knowledge base can also be an important 
resource to further refine its contents and the searching 
mechanism.  The Knowledge search module is shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Knowledge Search and Storage Modules 
 
Knowledge Storage Module 
 
We store security knowledge on the web server in the 
form of documents that include multimedia data such as 
text, video, and voice.  We refer to this web server as the 
"security knowledge base".  In the security knowledge 
base, 6 kinds of security knowledge are stored (as shown 
in Figure 3).  They are: security problem-solution 
documents, leveled security educational materials, general 
security solutions, knowledge map, organizational 
security policy, and the information about current security 
systems.  
The organizational security policy document includes 
the organizational security policy, procedures, and records 
of previous punishment.  We include this document in the 
knowledge base for two reasons.  One is to give the user 
information related to the organization’s security policy.  
The other is to show potential computer abusers that the 
organization is serious about monitoring and controlling 
computer abuse.  The information about security systems 
within the organization includes a document describing 
the system's security functions, operating techniques, 
audit records, and know-how accumulated over time.  
Problem solution documents suggest the appropriate 
solutions to computer security matters.  General security 
solutions include security tools such as vaccine programs, 
recent security accident reports, and the newest security 
newsletters.  
Security education materials contain the leveled 
security knowledge.  We develop these materials based on 
well-known security documents published by professional 
security organizations (e.g., NIST, RSA, SRI 
International, ISO, BSI) and by well-known experts (e.g. 
Pfleeger, 1995, Wood, 1994).  We classify these materials 
in three ways.  One is by the level of expertise, the second 
is by the contents covered in each area, and the third is by 
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user type (i.e., manager versus non-managerial employee.  
For example, we divide the contents of the materials into 
10 sub-topics: Risk Management, Physical Security, 
Cryptography, Application Security, Operating System 
Security, Database Security, Network Security, 
Administrative Security, Policy and Ethics on Security, 
and Business Continuity Planning.  
The security knowledge base contains critical 
resources that must be protected by highly trusted security 
measures.  Since access by insiders or malicious outsiders 
can cause a major disaster, we consider measures to 
assure the integrity, confidentiality and availability of the 
security knowledge base.  To assure the integrity, only the 
top-level security manager is allowed to modify the 
knowledge base. To assure the confidentiality, we suggest 
multilevel security systems that give users limited access 
rights.  For example, when user tries to access SKMS 
outside the company, firewall first checks out his access 
right and then SKMS checks again his password and user 
name.  Finally, to insure continuous availability, the 
knowledge base is implemented as a fault-tolerant system 
that endures in emergency situations.  
 
Knowledge Sharing Module 
 
SKMS performs its knowledge sharing functions under an 
IT organizational infrastructure such as a groupware 
platform or an intranet.  Specially, SKMS has two sharing 
support modules: the BBS and the knowledge map.  The 
BBS, managed by security personnel, includes newly 
updated security information, users’ security suggestions, 
and recent punishment reports. Users can make 
suggestions using the BBS without fear that their 
comments will be accessed by anyone outside the 
organization.  However, when a user thinks the suggestion 
is very critical to their organization's security, he/she can 
submit it directly to security managers for their feedback.  
The knowledge map functions like yellow pages.  It maps 
specific problem domains to appropriate experts who 
have solutions.  Users can then communicate with these 
experts using e-mail to get the necessary information.  
This map also increases the opportunity for users to 
access and share solutions among themselves, with a tutor 
or the designated security manager, through several 
communication media.  Through this tutorship, users can 
learn about security knowledge more easily, and at the 
same time, security managers can learn more about the 
day-to-day operational situation in the organization.  For 
sharing knowledge securely, the implementation of a 
trusted network is prerequisite. This includes secure 
network architecture for assuring continuous operation 
and includes user authentication, encryption, and access 
control systems.  For example, when a user wants to 
access the security knowledge base from outside the 
organization, a firewall should screen the request to 
determine if that user has access privileges. Figure 4 
shows the secure knowledge sharing mechanism in 
SKMS.  
 





SKMS includes motivational factors in its scope.  Its 
importance was supported by several studies (e.g., Parker, 
1998) positing that traditional awareness programs 
experienced the failure since they did not or less 
implement motivational factors for attracting 
organizational members. We include three main 
motivational factors into this model. First, SKMS 
includes several kinds of rewards such as incentives, 
bonus or fame, or fast promotion into its scope, which 
were not well supported by the traditional security 
awareness programs. As showing organizational members 
the highly positive correlation between the levels of 
interest and knowledge about a computer security and the 
organizational success, SKMS can motivate them.  
Secondly, SKMS provides them more user friendly GUI, 
fast and exact search engines, learning materials based on 
the levels of security or IT knowledge, and give 
diversified access channels to overcome space and time 
limitation.  For example, it is possible to develop SKMS 
website as the useful and playfulness site that 
encompasses a lot of interesting information that is related 
to not only computer security, but also other issues, such 
as finance, sports, weather, and news site. It can induce 
the employee to visit SKMS website and help to mitigate 
the negative sight to computer security. The last is to 
encourage organizational members to a supportive and 
positive organizational culture on computer security.  It 







In this research, we suggest SKMS as an effective 
approach for promoting organizational security 
awareness.  SKMS comprises both a security awareness 
program and security knowledge enhancement methods.  
It encompasses both managers and non-managerial 
employees, overcomes time and place limitations, and 
provides multi-level educational materials.  It also gives 
users diversified, up-to-date security knowledge using a 
variety of acquisition mechanisms, and provides fast, 
exact search results using various search mechanisms.  
Additionally, it provides users with a convenient 
knowledge sharing method using a bulletin board system 
and knowledge maps, based on an attractive GUI that 
promotes ease-of-use. 
In the context of a supportive organizational culture, 
SKMS can help motivate users to learn security 
knowledge.  By implementing SKMS, security managers 
can lessen their burden and use their slack time to focus 
on security enhancement in their organizations.  With 
these features, SKMS can promote organizational 
members’ interest in and knowledge of computer security 
and provide a more cost effective way to cope with 
computer abusers, compared to conventional security 
awareness programs.  Table 1 shows a comparison 
between traditional security awareness programs and 
SKMS. 
 
Table 1. Potential Comparison Between Traditional 
Security Awareness Programs and SKMS 






Subject of the program Manager 
Manager 
&Employee 
Knowledge Level Not Consider Consider 
Time and Distance Fixed Flexible 
User Participation Passive Relatively Active 
Viewpoint to Security Negative Relatively Positive 
Burden of Security 
Department 
Heavy Relatively light 
Quality of Shared 
Security Knowledge 
Low High 
Volumes of Knowledge Small Large 
Timeliness No (Slow) Yes (Fast) 
Variety of  knowledge Fixed Variable 
Knowledge Sharing Inefficient Efficient 
Organizational Culture  Compulsive Supportive 
Security Less Secure More Secure 
 
A key feature of SKMS is that it provides a number of 
motivational benefits to the organization, which can be 
explained based on the theory of planned behavior (TBP) 
(Ajzen, 1991).  The theory suggests that the intention of 
behavior depends on the attitude, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavior control factors of the actor.  Based on 
TBP, we can assume that if organizational members have 
a positive attitude, along with an environment that 
promotes learning and knowledge sharing, they will 
develop a stronger intention to access SKMS and increase 
their security awareness and knowledge.  As is shown in 
Figure 5, these benefits from SKMS contribute on the 
reduction of computer abuse by helping organizational 
members enforce and operate the security policy, 
optimally allocating their limited budgets in developing or 
operating security systems, and increasing their interest in 
computer security.  
 
Figure 5. The Potential Effects of SKMS 
 
 
In order for the implementation of SKMS to succeed, 
however, it is necessary to combine this new approach 
with traditional security awareness programs. The 
organization and organizational members need time to 
become familiar with the new system.  To do this, an 
optimal strategy is to operate both traditional programs 
and SKMS simultaneously during the system introduction 
period.  After having time to learn about and become 
accustomed into SKMS, organizational members can 
more easily adapt to this system. Organizations can 
consider integration SKMS with security outsourcing 
which provides more elaborated and newest security 
knowledge by outside security consulting company as a 
SKMS implementation alternative. Figure 6 shows the 
implementation strategy for SKMS.  
 





We have suggested a conceptual model of SKMS that we 
believe organizations can use as an effective tool in their 
fight against computer abuse.  However, currently, a 
major limitation is that the model has not yet been 
implemented in any organization.  We are in the process 
of developing a prototype SKMS, which we plan to test it 




SKMS provides organizational members with several 
effective and efficient components to support acquiring, 
storing, searching, and sharing security knowledge.  By 
using the system, organizational members can choose 
security knowledge according to their interest, level of 
knowledge, and work domains -- whenever, whatever, 
and wherever they desire.  This promotes a positive 
attitude and greater ease in learning security knowledge.  
All of these benefits can help to enhance the 
organization’s ability to fight computer abuse by 
enforcing and operating the appropriate security policy, 
incorporating security measures in the development of 
new systems, sharing security knowledge more 
efficiently, and identifying effective security solutions, 





ABA "Report on Computer Crime," The Task Force on 
Computer Crime-Section on Criminal Justice, 1984.  
Ajzen, I. "The Theory of Planned Behavior," 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 
(50), 1991, pp. 179-211.  
Avery, C. and R. Zeckhauser "Recommended Systems for 
Evaluating Computer Messages," Communications of 
ACM (40:3), 1997, pp. 88-89.  
Baskerville, R. "Information Systems Security Design 
Methods: Implications for Information Systems 
Development," ACM Computing Surveys (25:4), 1993, 
pp. 375-414. 
Bloombecker, J.J. "Short-Circuiting Computer Crime, " 
Datamation, Oct. 1, 1989, pp. 71-72. 
Buckman, R.H. "Knowledge Sharing at Buckman Labs," 
Journal of Business Strategy, Jan/Feb, 1998, pp. 11-15. 
Chang, S. F., Huang, Q., Huang, T., Puri, A., and 
Shahararay, B. "Multimedia Search and retrieval," A. Puri 
and T. Chen (eds.), in Advances in Multimedia: Systems, 
Standards, and Networks, 1999, NY: Marcel Dekker.  
Choo, C.W. The knowing organization: how 
organizations use information to construct meaning, 
create knowledge, and make decisions, 1998, NY: Oxford 
University Press.  
Crockett, J. "Employee Awareness: A Good Bet for 
Better Security," Consulting-Specifying Engineer, 1998, 
pp. 20-21.  
CSI Issues and Trends: 1999 CSI/FBI Computer Crime 
and Security Survey, March 1999. 
El Sawy, Omar A., and Bowles, Gene, " Redesigning the 
Customer Support Process for the Electronic Economy: 
Insights From Storage Dimensions," MIS Quarterly 
(20:4), 1997, pp. 457- 483.  
Ernst & Young Executive Guide to Internet Security, 
Information Systems Assurance and Advisory Services, 
2000.  
Fites, P., and M.P.J., Kratz Information Systems Security-
A Practitioner's Reference, 1993, NY: Van Nostrend 
Reinhold.  
Fink, D. "IS Security Issues for the 1990s-Implications 
for Management," Journal of Systems Management, 
March/April, 1995, pp. 47-49. 
Goodhue, D.L., and D.W. Straub “Security Concerns of 
Systems Users: A Study of Perceptions of the Adequacy 
of Security Measures,” Information & Management 
(20:1), 1991, pp.13-27.  
Harrington, S.J. "Computer Crime & Abuse by IS 
Employees," Journal of Systems Management, 
March/April, 1995, pp. 7-11. 
Hoffer, J. A., and D. W. Straub “The 9 to 5 Underground: 
Are You Policing Computer Crimes?” Sloan Management 
Review (30:4), 1989, pp. 35-44. 
Lee, J.A.N., G. Segal, and R. Steier "Positive 
Alternatives: A Report on the ACM Panel on Hacking," 
Communications of the ACM (29), 1986, pp. 297-299.  
Loch, K.D., Carr H.H., and Warkentin, M.E. "Threats to 
Information Systems: Today is Reality, Yesterday is 
Understanding," MIS Quarterly (17:2), 1992, pp. 173-
186. 
Kling, R. "Computer Abuse and Computer Crime as 
Organizational Activities," Computer/Law Journal (2), 
1980, pp.186-196. 
Meyer, J. From the Editor, Computer & Security (14:1), 
1995, pp. 2-3.  
Mulhall, T. "Where Have All the Hackers Gone - Part 3: 
Motivation and Deterrence," Computer & Security (16:4), 
1997, pp. 291-297.  
Newing, R.  BP AMOCO: Shared Learning from the US 
Army,http://www.usa.ft.com/ftsurveys/q56e6.htm(2000).  
Nonaka, I. And H. Takeuchi The Knowledge-Creating 
Company: How Japanese Companies Create the 
Dynamics of Innovation, 1995, NY: Oxford University 
Press.  
Parker, D.B. Computer Security Management, 1981, 
Reston, VA: Reston Publishing.  
Parker, D.B. Fighting Computer Crime-A New 
Framework for Protecting Information, 1998, NY: John 
Wiley & Sons.  




Rose, K., and R. Tom "Computer Security: Who's 
Minding The Store," The Academy of Management 
Executive (3:1), 1989, pg. 63-66.  
Shimeall, T.J. and J. J. McDermott "Software Security in 
an Internet World: An Executive Summary," IEEE 
Software, July 1999, pp.58-62. 
Smith, M. Commonsense Computer Security, 1993, 
Berkshire, England: McGraw-Hill.  
Stephen, H. "Recent Security Surveys," Computers & 
Security (17:3), 1998, pp. 207-210. 
Strain, I. Top Bosses Pose the Main Security Threat, 
Computer Weekly, Oct, 3., 1991, pp. 22.  
Straub, D. W. and R. J. Welke “Coping With Systems 
Risk: Security Planning Models for Management 
Decision Making”, MIS Quarterly (22:4), 1998, pp. 441-
465. 
Straub, D. W. and W. D. Nance “Discovering and 
Disciplining Computer Abuse in Organizations: A Field 
Study,” MIS Quarterly (14:1), 1990, pp. 45-62. 
Straub, D. W. Deterring Computer Abuse: the 
Effectiveness of Deterrent Countermeasures in the 
Computer Security Environment, Indiana University 
Graduate School of Business, 1986. 
Straub, D. W. “Effective IS Security: An Empirical 
Study," Information Systems Research (1:3), 1990, pp. 
255-276. 
Ulsch, M. "Getting Executive Attention," Security 
Management, Jan. 2000, pp. 32-33.  
Weiss J. "User-Friendly Security," Security Management 
(35:1), 1991, pp. 42-46.  
Wood, C.C. Effective Information Security Management, 
Elsevier Advanced Technology, 1991, Oxford, UK. 
Wood, C.C Information Security Policies Made Easy, 
Baseline Software, California, 1994. 
Zajac, B. P., Jr. " Personnel: The Other Half of Data 
Security," Computer & Security (7:2), 1988, pp. 131-132. 
1597
